Albert Owen: The HMIC report stresses the importance of security, in particular port security, yet in the port of Holyhead in my constituency and in Mostyn, the recent settlement refers to cutting back on port security to the tune of £150,000, which the chief constable and the police authority say will have to come out of local community policing. Will my right hon. Friend meet the Home Secretary to ensure that port security is given priority now and in any future merger?

Peter Hain: I am about to provide an answer to my hon. Friend—one that comes from the lips of his own chief constable. The chief constable of Gwent said:
	"We have more chance to give the public a policing service it desires by looking at the efficiencies of merging the four forces than we have as four forces standing alone."
	Despite my hon. Friend's rhetoric, unless we undertake reorganisation, our police officers in Gwent, north Wales and across Wales will not have the capabilities that the inspector of constabulary, who is not a politician, says that we need to deal with modern forms of threat to our security, including terrorism. If my hon. Friend wishes to ignore that, that his decision, but I will not do so. As Secretary of State for Wales, I provide the leadership that the Government need to provide to improve security for our citizens.

Paul Rowen: If he will list his official engagements for Wednesday 15th February.

Tony Blair: I cannot tell my hon. Friend exactly what we can do in relation to Bridgend, although I shall be happy to look into it. However, he is right about domestic violence. To date, we have invested somewhere in the region of £70 million, and we will invest even more. We are also providing support for refuges, but I am sure that my hon. Friend will agree that it is very important that victims of domestic violence come forward and report it in ever larger numbers. I am pleased to say that the police service is handling such complaints a lot more sensitively. The incidence of domestic violence has not risen, but one reason for the increase in recorded violent crime statistics is that people are coming forward and reporting to the police, who are recording it. That is beneficial. I assure my hon. Friend that we will continue to support the Corporate Alliance Against Domestic Violence, which was launched about a year ago. It is a very important signal that this Government and our country take domestic violence seriously.

Charles Clarke: I rise to urge right hon. and hon. Members to disagree to Lords amendments Nos. 5, 11, 15, 28, 31, 32 and 34, and to support amendments (a) and (b) in lieu of Lords amendment No. 34. Amendments (a) and (b) are minor, tidying proposals and I do not intend to devote more time to them. The key issue is whether the House will agree with another place and seek to restore its original wording.
	I shall remind the House how we got to this point. We passed counter-terrorist legislation in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, during the debates on which we said we would legislate to make prosecution easier, as required by hon. Members on both sides of the House. Page 53 of Labour's general election manifesto, on which we were elected, stated that
	"we will introduce new laws to help catch and convict those involved in helping to plan terrorist activity or who glorify or condone acts of terror."
	That was followed by the awful events of 7 July, which led naturally to a focus on the people who conducted those terrorist acts and on how they were recruited and incited, including through glorification.
	With the agreement of all parties in the House, a new Bill was introduced in the autumn. Of course, there were difficult issues of freedom and security—we were able to agree a lot that the Opposition said, but not all. Following that process, the House reached an agreement on the Bill, and that included a commitment to a review of the definitions of terrorism to be conducted by Lord Carlile and to reviews of the operation of the 2005 Act regime as well as a commitment to return to legislation, which will be introduced in the next Session, as I announced in a statement to the House a couple of weeks ago, and which was generally welcomed. I believe that that was a solid and stable basis on which to proceed, not only recognising the genuine differences of opinion but seeking to find a good way to make progress.

William Cash: The Home Secretary knows that I have strong views on human rights legislation. However, given that it exists and it is necessary to have clear and unambiguous provisions in relation to matters of such importance, will he explain why the Government have put statement of compatibility with European convention on human rights on the front of the Bill when the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which Parliament has charged with examining such matters, has said that there is incompatibility with articles 5 and 10 of the convention? Why does he thus continue to pursue his arguments?

Charles Clarke: No. The hon. Gentleman has intervened already and I want to make progress.
	The reason we made a manifesto commitment and why we think glorification should be dealt with as I propose is that people who glorify terrorism help to create a climate in which terrorism is regarded as somehow acceptable. They help to persuade impressionable members of their audiences that they have a moral duty to kill innocent people in pursuit of whatever political or religious ideology they espouse. In recent times, we have seen threats from extremists who claim to represent Islam. As I said in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz), leaders of the Muslim community in the UK and elsewhere have, quite properly, explained that such views do not represent true Islam. None the less, all too many people may be influenced by those who glorify terrorism and conclude that they have a duty to kill and injure innocent bystanders in the misguided belief that they are bound to do so by their faith. Our duty to those we represent is to do everything we can to prevent that from happening.
	Both Houses have agreed that there will be an offence of encouraging terrorism and that the offence will cover both direct and indirect encouragement. I am, however, concerned by the changes made to clause 1 and replicated in clause 21 by the Members of the other place. The Lords removed a provision which clarified that statements that constituted indirect encouragement included statements that glorified acts of terrorism and were statements from which those members of the audience who heard them could reasonably be expected to infer that what was being glorified was being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances. That was a clear provision in the Bill considered by the Lords. Taken with a definition of "glorification" in clause 20, it made what was being described perfectly clear. Moreover, it made it abundantly clear to everyone who had heard about the offence that glorifying terrorism in such a way that others might emulate it would no longer be tolerated.
	Instead of that clear provision, which sent a strong message to all those who are involved in recruiting terrorists, the Lords inserted an alternative provision stating that
	"'indirect encouragement' comprises the making of a statement describing terrorism in such a way that the listener would infer that he should emulate it."
	That alternative is unacceptable for three main reasons. I will explain those reasons in a moment, but perhaps I should first remind the House that glorification features in the Bill as an example of what is encompassed by the concept of indirect encouragement. It is not self-contained. Glorification as an offence is a subset of indirect encouragement as an offence and can be committed only if the conditions surrounding the main offence are met, as I just said to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Northfield (Richard Burden). Key among those conditions is the requirement that there must be an intention that others should be induced to commit terrorist offences or subjective recklessness on that point. Glorification without intention of emulation or without subjective recklessness cannot constitute an offence.
	As I said, the Opposition's preferred form of words is unacceptable for three reasons. First, instead of being an exemplary description of what indirect encouragement could be, it is an exhaustive description. In other words, the offence is limited so that it is committed by making available to the public a statement directly encouraging terrorism, or a statement indirectly encouraging it, but only by actually describing it in such a way that that the listener will infer that he should emulate it. The Government drafted the offence carefully so that it would cover all statements that were either an encouragement to terrorism or another form of inducement to terrorism. As we designed the offence, it covered statements that constituted direct and indirect encouragement and that made explicit references to terrorism, as well as those that encouraged terrorism but did not refer explicitly to it.
	Let me put the argument as simply as I can. The use of the word "describing" in the Lords amendment means that the provision would not catch, as the original wording would, glorification, praise or celebration of an act of terrorism that does not actually describe the act. Similarly, the reference in the wording inserted by the other place to "listener" also limits the scope of the provision. It confines the definition to statements that are capable of being heard and so, for example, would exclude statements written on placards or published on websites.

Dominic Grieve: Indeed, the definition also covers EOKA, Watt Tyler, Jack Cade and John Ball, so it is pretty wide. In those circumstances, we should restrict the scope of offences and ensure that they are neatly targeted, which is what the House of Lords has attempted to do.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman is right. This went to the heart of the debate in the other place. Lord Morris of Aberavon, a previous Labour Attorney-General and a person of great distinction who has always been a robust supporter of what the Government have generally been attempting to achieve, said:
	"This part of the clause is vague, uncertain and unnecessary. It would make it extremely difficult in practice for a judge to be able to direct a jury."
	He went on to say that, under the definition that the Home Secretary wants,
	"'glorification' includes any term of praise and celebration, and cognate expressions are to be construed accordingly".
	He went on:
	"I wrote to the Minister, and she kindly replied that she did not feel it would be appropriate for her to prepare draft directions to a jury or to place any example directions in the Library. That was because any directions would have to be related to specific cases under consideration. I have not sat as a recorder for a few years since the age of 65 when the previous Lord Chancellor declared that that was enough. He may well have been right. All recorders—presumably all judges—are supplied with a book of draft directions which are in general and are applied almost every day by judges across the land. The argument that directions would have to be related to specific cases under consideration does not hold water."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 17 January 2006; Vol. 677, c. 576.]
	That encapsulates the problem that glorification will pose. The Government would do well to heed what not only Lord Morris, but many others, including previous Law Lords, said in the course of the debate—and they were seeking to be conciliatory. Lord Ackner, who is not usually a friend of the Government, said:
	"My Lords, I agree that subsection (3) must clearly go, for the reasons which have been fully explained. However, I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, that this is no matter of principle but one of drafting."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 17 January 2006; Vol. 677, c. 580.]
	They were genuinely trying to help the Government, who have closed their ears and eyes to what they have been told. Consequently, this House is in danger of passing law that is unworkable.

Alistair Carmichael: Indeed. I shall not be too hard on the Government, because I am delighted that they dropped the reference to exaltation, a term which in my view has no place in statute.
	The problem is that the Government have never answered the fundamental question posed by the Opposition: what will this measure add to current law? We can all see the dangers. We can all see the chilling effect that it may have. We can all see the difficulties that may be caused to those of us who may at some time wish to engage in a legitimate protest and to send our support to those in other countries who labour under despotic and violent régimes, but may be prevented from so doing.
	If I may borrow a term from the management-speak of which we hear so much from the Government, I think it is incumbent on us to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. We can all see the cost of the legislation; the benefit is less clear. On that basis, I urge the House to retain the Lords amendments.

William Cash: In view of the time, I shall speak briefly. The debate has demonstrated with absolute clarity the need to take back these provisions, to consider them in the recess and to propose words that will make sense and can be defined by the courts. This is not just simply a question of whether the public have a view about what is glorification. None of us in a general sense would want terrorism to be glorified, but that not the problem.
	The problem is that such words have never been construed in any court. They are incapable of being construed properly in any court, and they will lead to grave uncertainty. Indeed, to turn the Prime Minister's argument on its head, far from producing the results that he seems to want to achieve, they will almost certainly lead to the acquittal of the very persons whom he would want to be prosecuted and convicted. That is the ultimate test.
	What the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary have been saying today will lead to the acquittal of people on grounds under which they would have been prosecuted successfully in relation to the whole series of enactments that have been described already, including the two enactments of 1861, the Terrorism Act 2000 and a stack of others.
	Such provisions are available. Including them in the Bill will create confusion and uncertainty, so they should be included in the consolidation Bill to which the Home Secretary referred the other day. In the meantime, he should go back to the drawing board and come up with proposals that both make sense and will result in what the people of this country really want.

Hazel Blears: The right hon. Gentleman will be aware that people access material and images from the web. Sometimes people who have been involved in terrorist activity have said that they were influenced by material that they were able to access. The problem is therefore real. It is important that we take every step we can to try and prevent people being unlawfully drawn into terrorist activity. Clause 1 includes the new offence of indirectly encouraging people to get involved in terrorist activity.
	It is important that we seek to use all available means, because in this global world people are increasingly using technology, the internet and methods of communication other than writing a simple statement or making a speech. We have already debated how people communicate, and most people think it appropriate to limit the use of the web where it draws people into such activity.

Hazel Blears: I understand my hon. and learned Friend's point. I do not know how many people share the same problems, but I think that the internet industry is content with the provisions as we have set them out and feels that they strike the right balance. It is not looking for extra judicial oversight or for an appeal process. We must get the balance right between being able to take swift action on a very fast-moving medium—the internet—and ensuring that people can still avail themselves of the proper defences to any prosecutions that might be brought but cannot avail themselves of the defence that they did not know about the material if they have been put on notice. That is a sensible and straightforward provision.
	As I said, there is also no immediate penalty for failing to comply with a notice. In those terms, there is no need for an appeal process. If we want to prove offences under clause 1, we have to prove intent or subjective recklessness. In addition, there are the provisions on the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the hurdle of the public interest. I talked about hurdles at great length when we debated this legislation in the past. I am concerned to ensure that there are safeguards.
	I do not want provisions that lead to arbitrary prosecution, but I think that these provisions are appropriate. The amendments tabled in the other place would make them much less effective. If we are going to say that there needs to be judicial oversight of such material by a High Court judge, as suggested, that would give the issuing of one notice, which merely notifies and requests the person to take down material, the same amount of judicial scrutiny as the continuing detention provisions. I genuinely think that in this case we have got the balance right, with a specially trained special branch officer who works with the anti-terrorist unit, and is used to dealing with these issues, going to the service provider and saying, "This material is there, you ought to take it down, and if you don't you can't avail yourself of the defence that says that says you didn't know." It is a very straightforward issue, and with the greatest respect I think that Members are making heavy weather out of it.

Lynne Featherstone: That is true. A host of cases might be caught, or might not. The point of judicial oversight is to confer an extra level of security to any decision that is made.
	If a notice is served, an internet service provider will inevitably remove material that is cited as being unlawfully terrorism-related, because it will not be in the provider's interest to risk the cost, the fight and the possible prosecution for the sake of something about which, ultimately, he may not care very deeply. He might not be caught for non-compliance with the notice, but he would be caught under the provision relating to an endorsement being seen to have been given if the material were not removed within two days, and would be exposed to prosecution. Obviously, service providers would fight shy of that. No wonder they are not complaining to the Minister; I do not think they can. Accepting the notice and removing the material is the line of least resistance.
	The judgment on material thought to be unlawfully terrorism-related becomes crucial. The Bill refers to the opinion of a constable. I am impressed by the sudden escalation of the qualifications of that constable to the level of special branch, with authority to give particular guidance; but the Bill uses the word "constable" nevertheless. While I have the greatest respect and admiration for our police officers, the usual remit of the police is to submit those suspected of law-breaking to the judiciary for their decision. Under the Bill, a constable will be the arbiter.
	There is a history surrounding the opinions of police officers, particularly in respect of issues of this kind. We know that stops under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 resulted in a 300 per cent. increase in the number of stops after ll September. We know of the disproportionality relating to stop and search and stop and account. To my personal knowledge the Met have worked hard to eradicate such tendencies from their police officers, but that disproportionality persists. But even when a constable's discretion—which is vital to police work—is used, it is used to bring a suspect to justice. The constable is not supposed to act as judge and jury.
	Moreover, the likely consequences of making the constable, through his "opinion", the final arbiter over what is unlawfully terrorism-related may expose the police to public criticism or ridicule should the "opinion" be obviously and substantively wrong, and subject them to unwanted publicity. The same would apply if a provider took his case to court and won—although, as I have said, I doubt that that will happen. The police would become vulnerable if required to make a judgment that a police person is not trained to make, and which it is not appropriate for him or her to make. The police have enough to contend with. Their role should be to bring offenders to justice—to submit to a judge those who, in their opinion, deserve a notice to remove material from the web. Judicial oversight would afford some protection to free speech, and to police officers who would otherwise be charged by the Government's edict with an inappropriate power to decide. Accepting the Lords amendment would have merely a time consequence, as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) said. We are talking about a delay of a few hours, not about going to court. The measure is akin to an arrest warrant rather than a court hearing, so the Minister's argument is somewhat specious.
	Judicial oversight would lend weight and seriousness to a decision to issue a notice to remove such material, which can only be a good thing; such extra protection has to be a worthy thing. The added benefit is that in referring cases to judges, constables would have more time to weigh the decision being taken; as a result, they would not refer cases so lightly. Constables themselves would consider whether a particular case was worthy of judicial oversight, which provides an extra protection.
	We all understand what the Government are trying to do, but we must ensure that we do not in any way become like those authorities and Governments around the world whom we judge so harshly for their censorship and lack of freedoms. The safeguards that we propose are relatively minor, but they are necessary.

Hazel Blears: We have signed memorandums of understanding with three countries. I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the exact number of individuals involved. I am sure that he will understand that these are complex, difficult and sensitive arrangements, but we are determined to continue our negotiations with a range of other countries, to determine whether we can agree memorandums of understanding with them. I was pleased that Lord Carlile's report stated that the memorandums of understanding were appropriate in the context of deportation. When commenting on arguments that it was inappropriate to proceed in this way, he stated:
	"It really is a counsel of despair to suggest that no verifiable or satisfactory agreement can ever be reached with apparently recalcitrant countries. There are international organisations and mechanisms available and devisable to ensure an appropriate level of verification, and the effort is certainly well worth making."
	I am pleased that Lord Carlile believes that our attempts in this difficult area are worth pursuing.
	The Terrorism Bill that is now before Parliament will introduce some new offences, including the offence of acts preparatory to terrorism, but there will remain a comparatively small number of cases in which we are unable to prosecute but in which individuals pose a very real terrorist threat. In such circumstances, it is vital that the Government and the law enforcement agencies are able to act to reduce the risk that such individuals pose. Again, Lord Carlile has provided support for this view. His report states, in paragraph 61:
	"As a last resort (only), in my view the control order system as operated currently in its non-derogating form is a justifiable and proportional safety valve for the proper protection of civil society."
	Lord Carlile has clearly thought deeply about these issues, and come to that conclusion. I would like to thank him for the way in which he has conducted his analysis of the information he has seen. As he said in the introduction to the report, he has attempted to give a proper technical analysis of the operation of the Act, but he has tried to do it in a way that is accessible to the lay reader. Technical reports often do not have those characteristics, but Lord Carlile's report genuinely strikes the right balance between good operational information and accessibility. I would also like to thank the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which has produced a very informative report and a detailed reflection of the legislation and its operation. Both reports will be invaluable in informing the House in our consideration of these important issues.
	I shall turn now to the working of control order powers. Sections 1 to 9 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 provide for the making of control orders. Control orders are preventive orders that enable one or more obligations to be placed on individuals that are designed to prevent, restrict or disrupt their involvement in terrorism-related activity. They can be applied to any individual, whether a UK or foreign national, when the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in terrorist activity and considers that it is necessary for the purposes of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism. The grounds that must be set out before an order can be made therefore have two limbs—that an individual is involved in terrorism and that it is necessary to make an order to protect the public. The obligations that can be set out in the order should be tailored to tackle particular terrorism activities on a case-by-case basis. Any breach of those obligations in a control order without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence punishable with a prison sentence of up to five years and/or an unlimited fine.
	The Act makes provision for two types of order: derogating control orders and non-derogating control orders. The distinction between the two is that a derogation would be required if the obligations, individually or in total, amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of article 5 of the European convention on human rights. We have not sought to make any derogating control orders. At this stage, we have simply made non-derogating control orders. The Secretary of State must apply to the court for permission to make an order. Under the Act, in a case of urgency, the Secretary of State himself can make the order, but that must be referred immediately to the court, which must start considering that case within seven days. The judicial scrutiny is therefore pretty intense, arising from many of our discussions when the provisions were first considered.
	Once the control order is made, an automatic review process is triggered. That judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision provides independent judicial scrutiny. When we considered this legislation previously, the question of whether judicial review provided robust examination was debated. Lord Carlile, in paragraph 67 of his report, says that, in his view, judicial review is a robust jurisdiction, and points out that the way in which judicial review has developed means that the courts take a close and rigorous interest in such issues.

Patrick Mercer: I am grateful to be able to speak on this subject. As always, I was very interested in what the Minister had to say, especially about the lack of understanding of the seriousness of the threat that faces us.
	My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) has said that, when this order came before the House a year or so ago, the disagreement between the Opposition and the Government was one of the most serious of this Government's term in office. That is certainly my experience, although I have been in the House only a short time. The Minister has spoken about consensus, so I shall return to the subject of that disagreement on a number of occasions.
	There is no doubt that the review and renewal procedures for control orders are the result of the contest in both Houses that took place before the last election. Lord Carlile's report supports the Government, and lays special emphasis on the close personal attention that the Home Secretary has paid to each case. This time last year, that was definitely a cause for concern and I, for one, was not convinced that the Government would give the right level of scrutiny to a measure with which I disagreed. However, Lord Carlile has said that the scrutiny has been appropriate, and we should acknowledge that the Home Secretary has done his job to the extent that Lord Carlile is happy to congratulate him.
	On 28 February 2005, the Prime Minister was interviewed on "Woman's Hour", and his words stand in stark contrast to what has happened since. According to him, the security services were saying that
	"you have got to give us powers in between mere surveillance of these people—there are several hundreds of them in this country who we believe are engaged in plotting or trying to commit terrorist acts—you have got to give us power in between just surveilling them and being sure enough to prosecute them beyond reasonable doubt. There are people out there who are determined to destroy our way of life. There is no point in us being na-ve about it."
	It is interesting that the Prime Minister should have said that before the July attacks, and even more so in light of the past three weeks or so. In that time, there have been appalling demonstrations in the centre of the capital and the case of Abu Hamza, which I am sure that the Minister will agree could have been handled very much better.
	The Minister said that several hundred people were out there, but the fact is that a maximum of 18 individuals have been placed under control orders. Only nine remain under those orders, with the other nine awaiting deportation. How does the Minister rationalise what the Prime Minister said with the reality of the past year?
	In his report, Lord Carlile makes two specific recommendations. First, he said that a Home-Office led monitoring system should ensure that the restrictions imposed were the minimum necessary, consistent with public safety. Secondly, he said that we must ensure that the police reach clear conclusions that the evidence needed to prosecute individual controlees is not available. The report supports the Government's case for control orders, at least in the short term, but Lord Carlile told the Home Affairs Committee yesterday that 20 imams were trying to recruit in prisons and universities.
	I have already referred to the Abu Hamza case, and Lord Carlile's remark about the imams prompts me to ask the Minister how control orders are intended to be used against such targets. I am sure that all hon. Members respect the views of Lord Carlile. Given that only nine people are subject to control orders at present, what measures will be taken against the 20 imams to whom he referred? We are told that the security services have a list of nearly 100 people in this country who continue to preach hatred and to radicalise. I do not think that it is stretching a point to suggest that those people may adopt the sort of persuasive language that led to the attacks that took place on 7 and 21 July.

Alistair Carmichael: First, I acknowledge the contribution made in preparation for the debate in the report by my noble and learned Friend Lord Carlile of Berriew and in the trenchant report issued yesterday by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Both take a careful and detailed look at the subject. The tone of the two reports is not necessarily immediately compatible, but it is clear on a close reading that their conclusions have a great deal in common, even though they may not be expressed with the same force.
	It is worth reminding the House of the parliamentary history that has brought us to where we are today. On 16 December 2004, the House of Lords ruled that the detention of the nine foreign nationals held at Her Majesty's Prison Belmarsh was incompatable with the European convention on human rights. The powers created by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 were found to be in breach of ECHR on two counts. First, they only offered the possibility of indefinite detention where lesser restrictions on liberty could have been more proportionate. Secondly, they were discriminatory by reason of the fact that they applied only to foreign nationals. Either the detainees would be released, or new and proportionate restrictions had to be devised in the space of a few weeks.
	What we got was a rushed and controversial Bill. We performed our own version of the parliamentary "Nessun Dorma", as I recall, and we went from Second Reading to Royal Assent in just two and a half weeks. Our preference at the time—indeed, this was the Home Secretary's stated preference—was to find ways to prosecute such suspects in the criminal courts. Given the impending renewal of the derogation order, a stop-gap had to be found. I remind the Minister that we were willing to co-operate in finding an appropriate interim measure and that we started from the premise that control orders were acceptable on that basis, provided that the appropriate safeguards could be found.
	We had serious reservations on two points, however. We believed that the standard of proof required for the Secretary of State to sign a non-derogating control order was too low and that the standard of proof should have been raised to that of whether an offence had occurred on the balance of probabilities. We also argued that the power to impose a non-derogating control order should reside with the court, not the Home Secretary.
	Those points were echoed by the Joint Committee's report yesterday. On the first point, it said:
	"As far as non-derogating control orders are concerned, reasonable suspicion is in our view too low a threshold to justify the potentially drastic interference with Convention rights which such orders contemplate."
	On the second point, the Committee said:
	"We agree with the view expressed by the European Commissioner of Human Rights, that Article 6 ECHR properly requires that non-derogating control orders should initially be made not by the executive but by the judiciary. We also consider that our own constitutional traditions of due process, and of the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary, requires no less."
	The Committee, however, reserves its strongest criticism for the way in which the various restrictions on liberty available to the Home Secretary in designing a control order have been used. The Committee makes a strong case that the impact of the restriction on liberty is so severe that, in fact, it breaches several of the convention's articles.
	Lord Carlile very helpfully provided a standard list of control order restrictions as an annexe to his report. He notes:
	"The obligations include an eighteen hour curfew, limitation of visitors and meetings to those persons approved by the Home Office, submission to searches, no cellular communications or internet, and a geographical restriction on travel."
	If that régime is being imposed on controlees, with little or no variation to account for different risks and different personal circumstances, the Committee is surely correct to state that the obligations are
	"so restrictive of liberty as to amount to a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of Article 5(1) ECHR"
	Thus a deprivation of liberty is taking place without due legal process, contrary to the convention requirements. Similarly, the Committee believes that individuals are being denied a fair trial under articles 5.4 and 6.1, that control orders
	"carry a very high risk of subjecting those who are placed under them to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to article 3",
	that there is strong evidence to suggest that the régime
	"has a disproportionate impact on the rights of family members under Articles 8, 10 and 11"
	and that the law impacts disproportionately on foreign nationals and is therefore in danger of breaching article 14. In fact, that is the very point that started our parliamentary journey with the judgment in 2004.
	Let us also remember that the whole point of control orders was to remove the need for a derogation under the ECHR. The Act contains powers for the Home Secretary to issue a derogating control order. We were given to understand that that meant 24-hour house arrest, but that a vote of Parliament would be necessary to approve a formal derogation of the sort that was required by the Belmarsh legislation. The Act, however, neglected to set out any criteria for determining the dividing line between the control orders that would require a derogation and those that would not. This is a question that will ultimately be tested in the courts. In the meantime, can the Minister tell me where she thinks the line lies? What legal advice has she received and how sure can she be that the pro forma list of restrictions that was reproduced in Lord Carlile's report does not cross that threshold?
	The Minister has prayed in aid Lord Carlile's report a great deal tonight. The truth is, however, that it is not the glowing endorsement that she claims it to be. Lord Carlile expresses very serious concerns about the question of proportionality. He says:
	"On any view those obligations are extremely restrictive. They have not been found to amount to the triggering of derogation, indeed there has been no challenge so far on that basis—but the cusp is narrow."
	Of course, the Home Secretary could have chosen to treat these control orders as meeting the threshold for derogation, in which case the higher safeguards in terms of the standard of proof and the role of the court would have applied. On what basis was the decision not to do that taken? The Minister may not be able to answer that question tonight, but I suggest that it is something that the Home Secretary should inform the House about. I hope that if he does not do so by placing information in the Library, he will, as is customary, do so in a letter to myself and the hon. Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer).
	As we have heard, Lord Carlile does not call for a derogation but for
	"the establishment of a Home Office led procedure whereby officials and representatives of the control authorities meet regularly to monitor each case, with a view to advising on a continuing basis as to the necessity of the obligations imposed on each controlee."
	I hope that that will be acted upon with rather more dispatch than the Minister indicated in her speech. There is not a great deal of time; a great deal of urgency is attached to the matter.
	I again make the point about prosecution that I made to the Minister in an intervention earlier. Lord Carlile says:
	"I have seen letters from chief officers of police in relation to each controlee certifying that there was no realistic prospect of prosecution. Little is given by way of reasons."
	Is that not reminiscent of the situation that we had with the Belmarsh detainees? Some of them were detained for several years, yet answers to parliamentary questions indicated that the police conducted no ongoing investigation during that time with a view to bringing them to trial. That demonstrated a complacency on the part of the Government. Once these extraordinary powers are in place, there is surely a moral duty on the Home Secretary to pursue prosecutions. That is the undertaking that we have always been given in the House. In the case of the 2005 Act, there is a statutory duty and it concerns me that the Home Secretary does not appear to be fulfilling it.
	Neglect would also be an appropriate word to describe the unintended consequences of the Act on the innocent families of those who are subject to control orders. That is the point on which the hon. Member for North-West Leicestershire (David Taylor) intervened on the Minister earlier. She cannot afford to be complacent or blasé on that issue.
	The annexe attached to Lord Carlile's report reveals another interesting fact. Hon. Members will have noted that it shows that there is essentially a fill-in-the-gaps exercise that allows the Home Office to tailor a document to include details such as a suspect's address and a list of individuals with whom he is not allowed to communicate. I was rather surprised to read the following examples of statements that are used:
	"You shall not outside of the residence . . . attend any pre-arranged meetings or gatherings (other than attending, but not leading, group prayers at a mosque)"
	and
	"You shall only attend one mosque of your choosing, subject to prior approval from the Home Office before your first visit."
	The system seems pretty much like one designed for Muslims. It is unfortunate that the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz) is not in the Chamber because he said during our earlier debate on the Terrorism Bill that in his experience, which is probably more substantial than that of anyone else in the House, the Muslim community was beginning to feel persecuted by the nature of the Government's terrorism legislation. When one sees conditions framed in such terms, one can certainly understand why. Why are not more neutral phrases used, such as "place of worship", instead of "mosque"? Do not the documents lend credence to those in the community who argue that the Government's anti-terrorism powers are used disproportionately against Muslims? Will such an approach build the inter-community harmony on which the Government put so much stress?
	The Government's approach to terrorism is a mess—it has been a mess since November 2001. We want to hear from the Government how we shall get out of that mess. In the closing debate on the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, the Home Secretary produced a timetable for further legislation that would have given the House the opportunity to consider in detail and change the control orders regime. A commitment was given to produce a draft Bill in the late autumn of 2005 and introduce a substantive counter-terrorism Bill in spring 2006. The events of 7 July led to renegotiation among the three main parties. It was agreed that control orders would be decoupled from other new offences and considered in a separate Bill in the early part of 2006.
	The Home Secretary indicated in his statement on 2 February that he favoured a further rethink, with draft legislation produced in spring 2007, followed by a Bill that would almost certainly be carried over into the next Session. I have no difficulty with the concept that a consolidating Bill is necessary. Such a Bill is inevitable because of the extremely rushed way in which we deal with much of the terrorism legislation that comes before the House. It is almost certainly inevitable as a result of the way in which the Government use programme motions, which mean that Bills do not receive proper scrutiny. The principal reason given for the time scale was the fact that the various reviews on the definition of terrorism needed to be concluded, but the definition is not central to the operation of control orders, although it is central to other measures, such as those in the Terrorism Bill.

David Amess: I welcome the opportunity to join the hon. Gentleman in paying tribute to those brave people in this country who are fighting for what they believe in. I salute what they are doing, and I hope that the Minister will find time to comment on the Government's approach to what they are trying to do.
	Tibetan Buddhists continue to face persecution as the Chinese Government attempt to diminish support for their independence. They interfere in every aspect of Tibetan life, and impose restrictions on the numbers of monks, nuns and monasteries, while populating all occupations with secular administrators. Leaders are continually persecuted, beaten and exiled—and Britain remains silent.
	Article 9 of the UN declaration on human rights states:
	"No one should subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile."
	As has been noted previously, there are numerous examples of arbitrary arrest, detention and exile among religious and media groups, but those instances of injustice are not limited to them. Innocent citizens filing petitions—the only real means of recourse, albeit typically futile—have been beaten and arrested for seeking justice on matters such as work compensation, local authority abuse and obtaining electricity, among other things.
	Political dissidents are targeted and subjected to some of the cruellest treatment. Often, they end up being incarcerated in mental institutions, as happened with the pro-democracy Wang Wanxing. In such instances, the so-called criminals are forced to undergo electro-shock therapy and to ingest high doses of antipsychotic drugs. They live in terror among people who are truly insane and often violent.
	Sadly, defenders of human rights are the group most targeted for illegal arrest. Zhen Enchong is a lawyer and human rights activist. He has been in prison for three years, and his family has been denied the ability to visit him or communicate with him. That perpetuates fears of ruthless beatings and mistreatment. When he was finally allowed to speak to his family, he reported that he had received a severe beating for requesting a piece of paper on which to write a letter to the Government listing the names of people who had died after forcible relocation.
	Many people regarded as disturbances to the state are punished by being incarcerated in "re-education through labour" camps. They can be held without charge for up to four years, with no legal counsel and no opportunity to face trial or undergo judicial review of their case.
	China's corrections institution can boast of one statistic—its position as the global leader in executions. Amnesty International has said that at least 3,400 executions—84 per cent. of the global total—were performed last year, while another 6,000 people were condemned to death in China alone. The true figures are classified as state secrets, but are believed to be much higher.
	People can be sentenced to death when found guilty of one of 68 crimes, ranging from murder to non-violent and economic offences that include tax fraud, smuggling and counterfeiting. Those statistics are a cause for much concern, given the widespread flaws in the judicial system such as lack of transparency and rampant corruption, and the seeming impossibility of attaining justice or even recourse, especially in rural China—yet Britain remains silent.
	Given those aspects of the Chinese criminal justice system and the criminal practices the Government exert on their female population, I am baffled by the lack of concern shown by our Government about China's one-child policy and reproductive regulations. Article 16.3 of the United Nations declaration of human rights states:
	"The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State."
	That being so, it is unbelievable that the Chinese Government could actually sanction a policy of murder and prevention of life, via forced abortion and sterilisation, to ensure the obedience of the female population to the one-child rule, through the Chinese Population Association. In four months in the Linyi county alone, 7,000 women were subjected to such reproductive practices. According to Chinese Government statistics, IUDs and sterilisation account for more than 80 per cent. of all birth control methods employed. Thanks to reports such as Lord Alton's column in The Universe pertaining to China's one-child policy, those disgraceful policies are now being uncovered. However, the UK still provides international aid that helps fund agencies that finance the Chinese Population Association, such as the United Nations Population Fund—the UNFPA. In contrast, the United States has cut all funding to the UNFPA and instead directed the monetary contribution to humanitarian organisations that help women and children directly.
	Not only are women in China being subjected to horrid reproductive procedures, but the female gender suffers from the moment of conception. There is a natural inclination towards male children in order to perpetuate the family name. That traditional preference has led to massive female infanticide, sex-selective abortions, and abandonment and neglect of baby girls. In 2002, a survey in the Hainan province discovered that 68 per cent. of all abortions were of female foetuses. The male-female birth ratio is 116.9:100, whereas the global norm is 106:100. For second births, the ratio jumps to 151.9:100. Women are also threatened with job loss, demotion, eviction, property confiscation and exorbitant fines up to 10 times annual income.
	I would like the Minister to address the following points. Why is the Government's criticism of China much weaker than that directed at other countries that commit human rights abuses, such as Zimbabwe? Why do the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary not publicly criticise China in the same forthright terms as their own human rights annual report? Do the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary stand by the criticism of China's political system by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld? If so, why have they not publicly raised it in the same terms? If not, do they disagree with the Americans about the need for the Chinese to have political freedom?
	Trade with China is very important, but as it benefits both us and the Chinese, it is in neither the Chinese nor the British national interest to restrict it. For decades, the Government have tried quiet diplomacy and it has not worked, and nothing the Minister can say in his response will convince me that it has. Is not it better to combine openness to trade and business with frank criticism of Chinese human rights abuses?
	Article 5 of the universal declaration on human rights states:
	"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
	The Chinese Government are indisputably in violation of that important article, as well as the majority of the remaining 30 articles that I have not had time to mention.
	I ask the Government, rather than continuing the EU-China dialogue on human rights that has been going on for more than a decade, and the UK-China talks that have been going on for even longer, when will the talking end and the action begin? How can the Government persist unabashed with their trade with China in the knowledge that it continues to empower that oppressive regime? How can the Government continue to supply aid to fund programmes such as those of the Population Association of China, which contributes to the sterilisation of thousands of women and the abortion of millions of babies?
	It is time for our Government to stand up and implement strong measures to deter Chinese persistence in unconscionable human rights abuses. It is time for the UK to admonish international business for perpetuating the policies of the Chinese Government. It is time for UK to begin supplying funds directly to humanitarian groups that will unequivocally aid Chinese women and children. In the interests of a silenced population, it is time for the UK to end economic empowerment of the Chinese regime. It is time at long last for the British Government to speak out clearly, loudly and firmly against human rights abuses in China.